Iran

Key Issues

Iran nuclear issue

Shortly after the inauguration of Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, Iran resumed nuclear talks in Geneva on October 15-16, 2013 with the P5 +1. The Iranian delegation was led by Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif. The successful conclusion of the nuclear talks and reduction of tensions with the West was a core issue of the Rouhani election platform, along with increased state support for the private sector, as well as the "desecuritization" of the political environment. (http://lobelog.com/setting-the-stage-for-round-ii-of-iran-nuclear-talks-in-geneva/)

One of the major points of contention was the heavy-water reactor in Arak, which uses plutonium rather than enriched uranium, providing an alternative and more efficient pathway to a nuclear bomb. Countries such as Israel argued that such reactors had to be addressed before it became operational, at which point it would not be possible to destroy it militarily without environmental consequences. Israel had destroyed such reactors previously in Iraq in 1981, as well as in Syria in 2007. (https://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/10/world/iran-nuclear-talks.html?smid=tw-share)

Another major source of contention was the issue of what type of sanctions relief, and when. P5+1 was agreeable to considering temporary sanctions relief in exchange for a freeze in Iran's programs during the negotiations. Iran wanted all sanctions, including those on its oil and banking industries, to be lifted as part of the eventual final agreement. This was a more difficult proposition due to the fact that such sanctions were passed by Congress and therefore would require Congressional approval to be lifted. The Obama administration was more readily willing and able to release Iran's overseas funds in step-wise installments. While the European countries were less restricted in their ability to lift sanctions, reinstating them would be a more difficult prospect. (https://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/10/world/iran-nuclear-talks.html?smid=tw-share)On

On November 23, 2013, a temporary agreement was reached between Iran and P5+1, with a six-month deadline for the final agreement by July 2014. The provisions were as follows:

Iran would cease the enrichment of uranium beyond the 5% and convert its stockpile of 20% enriched uranium to oxide
Iran would agree not to install new centrifuges or build new enrichment facilities, or start any existing centrifuge not already in operation
The US would agree to provide $6 to $7 billion in sanctions relief, $4.2 billion of which would come from oil revenue that had been frozen in foreign banks.

Critics of the temporary agreement included Israel as well members of the US Congress who believed any agreement should include the cessation of enrichment activities as well as the complete dismantling of Iran's nuclear program. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf nations expressed concern that Iran may use its newfound latitude to exert more regional influence amongst Shia populations and destabilize the Middle East, in particular Sunni-run states. Other ME nations such as Qatar, Kuwait, and Oman expressed wishes that the agreement would contribute to peace and stability in the region. (https://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/24/world/middleeast/talks-with-iran-on-nuclear-deal-hang-in-balance.html?_r=0) (https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/25/iran-deal-saudi-arabia_n_4337218.html?ncid=edlinkusaolp00000003)

In May and September 2013, the US eased bilateral sanctions on Iran, first lifting sanctions on the sale of personal communications technology to Iran, then allowing for humanitarian and good-will activities, from the provision of health services, disaster relief, and wildlife conservation, to sports-related activities, sponsorships, and training. (https://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/11/world/middleeast/us-eases-sanctions-to-allow-good-will-exchanges-with-iran.html?partner=rss&emc=rss&smid=tw-nytimes)

Negotiations continued toward a final agreement, but by February 2014, both sides were pessimistic about reaching an agreement that would be satisfactory to both sides. Also at that time, the West believed Iran's nuclear program was too far advanced for Iran to agree to dismantling it or cease uranium enrichment and plutonium production, as previous UN Security Council resolutions demanded. Instead, the West only hoped to increase the amount of time it would require for Iran to make sufficient material for a bomb, thereby allowing time for detection and military action as necessary. To achieve this, Iran would have to allow UN inspectors to monitor its enrichment activities, stop using most of its centrifuges, enrich uranium only to a low concentration, and limit its nuclear research. Such terms were unacceptable to Iran, which continued to claim that its enrichment activities were for peaceful civil purposes. (https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear/iran-and-u-s-agree-final-nuclear-deal-may-be-unreachable-idUSBREA1G1EO20140217)

In March 2014, Iran announced that it had acquired four types of ballistic missiles, two with multiple warheads. The medium-range Qiam ballistic missile, equipped with multiple warheads, was acquired for the specific purpose of targeting US bases in the region. (https://english.mojahedin.org/newsen/27181/irgc-has-acquired-missiles-to-target-us-bases)

On April 18, 2014, the US announced it would release $450 mil of frozen Iranian funds, following an IAEA report that Iran was complying with the terms of the interim six-month agreement. According to the report, Iran had converted at least three-quarters of its 20% enriched uranium stockpile. (https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27076367)

iran's role in syria

The Iranian regime has invested billions in providing military advisors, troops, and weaponry to Syria, at the expense of its own economy, already strained by sanctions and a significant devaluation of its currency between 2011-2013, fueling discontent among its citizens. It sees its role in Syria defending the Assad regime as critical to its national security and military strategy, in particularly with regards to Israel. Moreover, it perceives its role in Syria as a boost to its bargaining power with regards to a nuclear deal. (https://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/20/world/middleeast/blast-hits-shiite-area-of-beirut.html?smid=tw-share)

historical context

The US and Iran has not had diplomatic relations since 1980, one year after the Iranian Revolution. In contrast to present circumstances and the predominantly adversarial dynamics between the US and Iran since 1979, the US and the Islamic Republic of Iran had a brief moment of constructive relations after September 11, 2001. At the time, the US and Iran shared common enemies in the Taliban as well as Al Qaeda, and Iran proved instrumental in providing intelligence on Taliban military strategy, as well as playing a key role in the eventual establishment of the new Afghan government led by Hamid Karzai. The US and Iran continued to hold constructive talks on security and reconstruction issues, up until early 2002 when then US President George W. Bush identified Iran as part of the "axis of evil." From that point onward, the Iranian government decided cooperation with the US was a fruitless exercise. Iran did a 180-degree u-turn in its strategic approach to Afghanistan, releasing an Afghan warlord in its custody back into the country, where he launched attacks against the new Afghan government and coalition forces. In 2007, the US attempted but failed to dissuade Iran from supporting Mohqtada al-Sadr, who was launching attacks against the Iraqi government and allied coalition forces in Iraq. US Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker who presided over these negotiations stated, "The government of Iran is clearly an adversary, but it is also a rational actor. And like all governments, it is capable of being pragmatic and flexible when it is in its interests to do so." (https://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/04/opinion/talk-to-iran-it-works.html?_r=0)

References

Farhi, Farideh. "Understanding Iran ahead of Geneva Talks Round II." November 5, 2013. Lobelog.com. http://lobelog.com/setting-the-stage-for-round-ii-of-iran-nuclear-talks-in-geneva/

Landler, Mark and Gordon, Michael R. "Talks with Iran fail to produce a nuclear agreement," The New York Times, November 9, 2013. (https://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/10/world/iran-nuclear-talks.html?smid=tw-share)

Gordon, Michael R. "Accord reached with Iran to halt nuclear program," The New York Times, November 23, 2013. (https://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/24/world/middleeast/talks-with-iran-on-nuclear-deal-hang-in-balance.html?_r=0)

McDowall, Angus. "Iran Deal can be step to overall nuclear solution," The Huffington Post, November 25, 2013. (https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/25/iran-deal-saudi-arabia_n_4337218.html?ncid=edlinkusaolp00000003)

Gladstone, Rick. "US eases sanctions to allow good-will exchanges with Iran," The New York Times, September 10, 2013. (https://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/11/world/middleeast/us-eases-sanctions-to-allow-good-will-exchanges-with-iran.html?partner=rss&emc=rss&smid=tw-nytimes)

"IRGC has acquired missiles to target US bases," Iran News, March 8, 2014. (https://english.mojahedin.org/newsen/27181/irgc-has-acquired-missiles-to-target-us-bases)

“US freeing Iran funds as Tehran cuts uranium stockpile,” BBC News, April 14, 2014. (https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27076367)

Bernard, Anne, Erdbrink, Thomas, and Gladstone, Rick. "Beirut bombs strike at Iran as Assad's ally," The New York Times, November 19, 2013. (https://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/20/world/middleeast/blast-hits-shiite-area-of-beirut.html?smid=tw-share)

Charbonneau, Louis and Hafezi, Parisa. "Iran and US agree final agreement may be unreachable," Reuters, February 18, 2014. (https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear/iran-and-u-s-agree-final-nuclear-deal-may-be-unreachable-idUSBREA1G1EO20140217)

Charbonneau, Louis and Hafezi, Parisa. "US official says 'very hard' to get Iran nuclear deal," Reuters, November 21, 2013. (https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-us/u-s-official-says-very-hard-to-get-iran-nuclear-deal-idUSBRE9AJ10X20131120?feedType=RSS&feedName=Iran&virtualBrandChannel=10209&utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter&dlvrit=59365)

Crocker, Ryan C. "Talk with Iran, it works," The New York Times, November 3, 2013. (https://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/04/opinion/talk-to-iran-it-works.html?_r=0)