The war against terrorism

The "War against Terrorism" is a misnomer of sorts, for war itself breeds terrorism. A body of research has well established that terrorism is linked to economic and political instability. As one intelligence official puts it, it is the breakdown of military and law enforcement infrastructure that allows terrorist groups to thrive. Such breakdowns have occurred in recent history in places such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, and Syria, creating hotbeds and breeding grounds for terrorism. Terrorism and extremism feed off violence, and the like the heads of a hydra, multiplies with increasing instability and violence. 

In December 2013, the House and Senate Intelligence Committees stated during an panel that the threat of terrorism against Americans was higher than ever before, due to the proliferation and diversification of terrorist groups in the world. The number of fatalities as well as attacks had increased globally, as well as the methods of attacks. (http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/191670-intel-chair-warn-of-huge-malevolence) According to the START Global Terrorism database, the number of terrorism attacks and deaths set a new records in 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014. A microcosm of the global terrorist problem could be found in Syria, where according to the Syrian Foreign Minister in his statement at the UN General Assembly in September 2013, "terrorists from over 83 countries" had coalesced to fight the regime. Among these were a branch of al-Qaeda from Iraq, the Islamic State of the Levant (ISIL), which consisted largely of foreign fighters from various countries who were extreme radicals.

Terrorism is a dynamic target. Terrorist groups are fluid in nature and the jihadis shift from one group to another depending on circumstances. Al Qaeda under Zawahiri had four affiliate groups: Al Qaeda in Iraq, which was also known as ISIS/ISIL, Al Shabaab and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) which operated in North and West Africa, and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) based in Yemen. Jabhat al-Nusra operating in Syria was supposedly a branch under ISIS, but its leader pledged loyalty to Zawahiri as opposed to al Baghdadi. Differences in approach would create conflicts amongst the affiliates and AQ Central, such as the degree of brutality, concerns regarding alienation of other opposition groups, as well as whether the focus should be on fighting US presence in the region. (https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/north-africa/2013-11-19/how-zawahiri-lost-al-qaeda) When ISIL emerged in Syria, a number of foreign fighters left al-Nusra to join them, which subsequently made al-Nusra more palatable to local Syrian fighters who were reluctant to join a a group in part defined by extreme radical foreign fighters. (https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/in-syrian-civil-war-emergence-of-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-syria-boosts-rival-jabhat-al-nusra/2013/10/25/12250760-3b4b-11e3-b0e7-716179a2c2c7_story.html?utm_term=.2d25b39013b6) The nature of the groups changes as the composition of the groups changes, as groups split apart and merge, sometimes competing amongst themselves, sometimes collaborating. 

While religious ideology has been most prominently used by Islamist terrorists to unify their supporters, the use of extremist religious ideology is a means by which political agendas are perpetrated by its sponsors. Individual jihadis are more akin to foot soldiers, provided with salaries and easily replaceable, so that the decimation of individual terrorists leads to only the emergence of replacements. What we have witnessed through the rise and fall of ISIS is that as defeats multiply and morale falls, recruitment also falls, and the expansion of groups is curtailed. Limitations on funding also limits the growth of terrorist groups, so there could never be enough strategic emphasis placed on eliminating and/or discouraging potential sources of revenue, such as drug and human trafficking, energy resources such as oil fields and ports seized in warfare, as well as state and private donors. 

References

Wilson, Megan R. "Intel Chair warns of huge malevolence," The Hill, December 1, 2013. (http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/191670-intel-chair-warn-of-huge-malevolence). 

McCants, Willam. "How Zawahiri lost al-Qaeda," Foreign Affairs, November 19, 2013. (https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/north-africa/2013-11-19/how-zawahiri-lost-al-qaeda

Morris, Loveday. "In Syrian civil war, emergence of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria boosts rival Jabhat al-Nusra," Washington Post, October 28, 2013. (https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/in-syrian-civil-war-emergence-of-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-syria-boosts-rival-jabhat-al-nusra/2013/10/25/12250760-3b4b-11e3-b0e7-716179a2c2c7_story.html?utm_term=.2d25b39013b6)